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WILLS-DEVISE TO EXECUTOR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTIONAPPLICATION OF TRUST AND POWER DOCTRINES-Bequests to executors for distribution to persons to be selected by the executor
may be and have been treated in many different ways. Traditionally, such bequests are categorized by the courts in terms of
trust, power, or gift law. Inasmuch as each of these bodies of
doctrinal law has grown independently with little attempt by
the judiciary to interrelate their operative characteristics, classification frequently spells substantial difference in terms of
the validity, construction, and effect of the devise.
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A comparison of the results reached in two basic cases illustrates the problem. In the first case, testator devised "the
residue of my estate to be disposed of in accordance with the
judgment and advice of my executor." This bequest, considered
as creating a discretionary power, was held valid and the executor
was permitted to designate the persons who would take beneficially .1 In the other, the testator devised "the residue of my
estate to my executor in trust, granting the executor absolute
authority to dispose of the residue." This devise was held totally
void under trust law which does not permit, as will be indicated
below, such an indefinite class of takers. 2 Thus, although in
terms. of apparent testamentary intent the charge upon the executor was substantially identical in both cases, the law as it
has developed dictates conflicting results. Because of a failure
by the courts to correlate the laws of trust and power, this
striking inconsistency is perpetuated. This comment is designed
to demonstrate the potential. anomalies which exist in traditional
thinking in this area and to point up some possibilities for correlation of the hitherto unrelated concepts developed in the
trust and power realms.

I. Traditional Law and Analysis
In each decision on the legal effect of a testamentary clause
granting some distributive choice to the executor there are two
steps in process of analysis. The court will first classify the clause
as creating or attempting to create a trust, power, or gift. Having chosen the body of applicable law, the court will then proceed to give effect to the terms thereof solely in terms of the
single body selected. Because of the immense differences in result imposed by doctrines in each of the three legal areas, the
court's initial step is a fortiori as important as the second. Both
therefore merit attention.
A. Rules of Construction. The decisions provide few clearcut guides for predicting whether a given devise will be construed as invoking power, trust, or gift rules. The fact that a
transferee is an executor has led some courts to presume that

l

An example of such a holding, based on language essentially like the first devise,

is Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 A. 588 (1902).
2

An example of such a holding, based on language essentially like the second devise,

is Estate of Ralston, l Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934).
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the transfer was in trust,3 but other courts have reached gift or
power constructions in an identical situation.4 Similarly, use of
the terms "trustee" or "in trust" has been made the basis for
finding a trust intention.5 These terms, on the other hand, may
be held merely to evidence some trust intent, leaving the way
open for a finding that power or gift law should be applied if
the court finds the construction more consistent with the apparent testamentary intent.6 "Trustee" may even be held to
have been employed solely to describe the person who is to receive
a beneficial gift.7
When the devise is to the executor "to dispose of" or "to
distribute," this language has been held to indicate a trust intent,
in order to avoid treating the word "dispose" or "distribute"
as mere surplusage. 8 Precatory words have also been construed
as indicating an intent not to make a beneficial gift,9 and such
language may even provide the basis for imposition of trust
obligations.10
It is also apparent that the construction placed upon legal
terms may vary, depending on whether they have been written
by a lawyer or a lay testator.11 The layman may use the term
"trust" as a synonym for "faith" or "confidence," not intending
3Thomas v. Anderson, (8th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 642; In re Brown's Estate, 122 N.Y.S.
(2d) 640 (1953); Tunis v. Dole, 97 N.H. 420, 89 A. (2d) 760 (1952). 3 PROPERTY R.EsTATEMENT
§323, comment e (1940). Cases on this point are collected in 104 A.L.R. 114 (1936) and
151 AL.R. 1438 (1944).
4 Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 A. 588 (1902); Gilman v. Gilman, 99 Conn. 598, 122
A. 386 (1923).
5 Estate of Ralston, I Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934). In Townsend v. Gordon,
308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944), and Harvey, Exr. v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, Ill
A. 437 (1920), the absence of the term "trusts" was used as a basis for a finding that the
executor took beneficially and not in trust. But Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am.
R.ep. 445 (1881), in finding that a trust was intended, held that the absence of the term
"in trust" was immaterial.
6 In re Renner's Estate, 358 Pa. 409, 57 A. (2d) 836 (1948). See dissenting opinion in
Estate of Ralston, I Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934).
7Norman v. Prince, 40 R.I. 402, 101 A. 126 (1917); Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730,
298 N.W. 895 (1941).
BThomas v. Anderson, (8th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 642; Davison v. Wyman, Exr., 214 Mass.
192, 100 N.E. 1105 (1913).
9 Sears v. Rule, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 374, 114 P. (2d) 57 (1941); Estate of Wadleigh, 250
Wis. 284, 26 N.W. (2d) 667 (1947).
10 First-Mechanics Nat. Bank v. First-Mechanics Nat. Bank, 137 N.J. Eq. 106, 43 A.
(2d) 674 (1945). In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952), states that
precatory words to an executor indicate a trust intent, but that precatory words to a nonexecutor do not indicate a trust. In Sears v. Rule, 45 Cal. App, (2d) 374, 114 P. (2d) 57
(1941), although the court held that precatory words created no trust, it also found that
the devisee did not take beneficially. See I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §25 (1935).
11 Will of Dever, 173 Wis. 208, 180 N.W. 839 (1921); Cheney v. Plumb, 79 Wis. 602,
48 N.W. 668 (1891).
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to conjure up the normal legal consequences associated with
the trust.
These are examples of the conflicting and inconsistent rules
from which a court may draw in its initial step of construing the
bequest in terms of the law that it invokes. Lack of clarity and
positiveness in these rules makes it- difficult to predict what construction will be reached in a given case; there is opportunity
for wide judicial discretion in choosing the applicable body
of law.
B. Substantive Doctrine. Having determined, in the initial
step of construction, that it is faced with a trust, power, or gift
case, the court will then apply the principles of that chosen body
of precedent.
If the court finds that the bequest provides for a gift to the
executor, there is of course no real problem as to the validity and
construction of a discretionary bequest.12 Such a construction
treats as surplusage all of the devise except "to my executor."
As the recipient of an absolute gift, the executor is free to transfer it to others in any manner that he desires.
If, on the other hand, a trust is found to have been intended,
the trust will be valid only if the testator has met the requirements imposed in the famous case of Morice v. The Bishop of
Durham,13 by designation of a definite trust beneficiary.14 Failure
in this latter respect totally invalidates the devise, and the executor is said to hold the corpus on a resulting trust for the
heirs or next of kin of the testator. 15
The extent to which a beneficiary must be defined has never
been accurately determined. The naming of a single individual
will of course satisfy the requirement, 16 as will the specification
of a small class the membership of which can be readily ascertained. Thus "the children of the testator" will suffice.17 If,
12 Norman v. Prince, 40 R.I. 402, 101 A. 126 (1917); Will of Dever, 173 Wis. 208,
180 N.W. 839 (1921); Harvey, Exr. v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, 111 A. 437 (1920); Cheney
v. Plumb, 79 Wis. 602, 48 N.W. 668 (1891); Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730, 298 N.W.
895 (1941). See note 30 infra.
13 IO Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805).
14 Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson, [1944] A.C. 341; Estate of Ralston, 1 Cal.
(2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934); Uloth v. Little, 321 Mass. 351, 73 N.E. (2d) 459 (1947);
Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. Rep. 445 (1881); Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221
(1881).
15 Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, IO Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805); Inland
Revenue Commissioners v. Broadway Cottages Trust, [1954] 3 All E.R. 120; Tunis v.
Dole, 97 N.H. 420, 89 A. (2d) 760 (1952). See note 14 supra.
16 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §112 (1935).
17 Moskowitz v. Federman, 72 Ohio App. 149, 51 N:E. (2d) 48 (1943); Markham v.
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however, the executor is to select the beneficiaries from a class
whose membership is neither identifiable nor ascertainable, the
trust will fail for want of a definite beneficiary under the Morice
rule. 18 A devise which permits the executor to select "anyone"
as the beneficiary of the trust is therefore too indefinite.19 All
members of the potential beneficiary class must be ascertainable,20 and some courts may even require the class to be readily
ascertainable. In this latter event, it would seem that an executor's choice among "the cousins of the testator" would fail
for want of definiteness, even though all the cousins could
possibly, though with great difficulty, be ascertained.21
That the executor is permitted to select the actual beneficiaries from a class designated by the testator in no way alters
the definite beneficiary requirement. To be considered valid,
such a bequest must specify a class as beneficiary with sufficient
specificity to meet the Morice rule without consideration, and
before exercise, of the power of selection.22
If the executor is to distribute property held in trust for
named purposes, instead of to a class of persons, the trust will fail
if the purposes are considered general, indefinite, and noncharitable.23 Where certain types of specific purposes are designated, e.g., for the care of horses and dogs,24 the executor will
be permitted to carry out the trust, despite the fact that there
is no definite beneficiary to enforce the trust. 25 Such an arrangeTibbetts, (S.D. N.Y. 1947) 79 F. Supp. 47; Shepard v. Newton, 304 Mass. 6, 22 N.E. (2d)
618 (1939). 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §120 (1935).
18 Uloth v. Little, 321 Mass. 351, 73 N.E. (2d) 459 (1947); Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H.
281, 133 A. 166 (1926); Murdock v. Bridges, 91 Me. 124, 39 A. 475 (1897); In re Brown's
Estate, 122 N.Y.S. (2d) 640 (1953); Minot v. Attorney General, 189 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149
(1905). 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §120, comment a, §122, comment a (1935).
19 Estate of Ralston, 1 Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934); Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass.
211, 39 Am. Rep. 445 (1881); Blunt v. Taylor, 230 Mass. 303, 119 N.E. 954 (1918); Haskell
v. Staples, 116 Me. 103, 1/)0 A. 148 (1917); Green v. Allen, 132 Me. 256, 170 A. 504 (1934).
Cases following this holding are collected at 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §124, note 4 (1956).
But see note 30 infra, which cites cases involving comparable language, in which the
devises were held to be gifts.
20 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §§120, 122 (1935). The Restatement would seem to make
this the only requirement. Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 680 (1878).
21 See Dalton v. White, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 55 (1942).
22 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); Minot v. Attorney General,
189 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149 (1905); Shepard v. Newton, 304 Mass. 6, 22 N.E. (2d) 618 (1939).
1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §120, comment c (1935).
28 Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805); Chichester
Diocesan Fund v. Simpson, [1944] A.C. 341; Brown v. Caldwell, 23 W. Va. 187 (1883);
Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891). 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §123 (1935).
24 In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889).
25In re Thompson, [1934] Ch. 342; In re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App. 417, 95 N.E.
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ment, termed an honorary trust, has been accepted as an exception to Morice v. The Bishop of Durham in that want of a
definite beneficiary does not produce total invalidity.
The third potential body of law which the court may construe the devise to have invoked is that surrounding a discre✓
tionary power of appointment. In power law, there is no basis
for invalidity analogous to the definite beneficiary rule in the
trust area. 26 Beyond the requirement that the testator must
furnish a standard whereby appointees can be identified as falling within the designated class,27 there is no requirement as to
size or specificity of the class of potential appointees. A general
power of appointment permits the appointment of anyone.
Courts have upheld "the friends of the testator" 28 and "everyone in the world except the executor"29 as valid classes of potential appointees. Where the donee's power of disposition is
absolute and unlimited, however, some courts may find that
testator intended a gift beneficially and thus remove the bequest
from the power area. 30 On the other hand, if the executor is made
the donee of a power by which the testator imposes an obligation
or duty on the executor to exercise the power, the courts will
construe the bequest as a power coupled with a trust or a power
in trust and apply traditional trust law with respect to definiteness of beneficiary.31
C. Application and Basis of the Definite Beneficiary Rule.
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen readily that a court's
(2d) 779 (1950); St. Stephen's Church v. Morris, 115 Va. 225, 78 S.E. 622 (1913); Estate of
Koppikus, I Cal. App. 84, 81 P. 732 (1905); Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 46 A. 278
0900); McCartney v. Jacobs, 288 III. 568, 123 N.E. 557 (1919); I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §124
(1935). See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§124 to 124.7 (1956).
26 Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 A. 588 (1902); Dormer Estate, 348 Pa. 356,
35 A. (2d) 299 (1944); Baldwin v. Davidson, 37 Tenn. App. 606, 267 S.W. (2d) 756 (1954);
Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944). 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT
§323 (1940).
27 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §323, comment h (1940). In re Coates, [1955] Ch. 495.
28 In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952).
29 In re Park, [1932] I Ch. D. 580.
80 Norman v. Prince, 40 R.I. 402, IOI A. 126 (1917); Appeal of Richburg, 148 Me.
323, 92 A. (2d) 724 (1952); Harvey, Exr. v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, 111 A. 437 (1920);
Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944). I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §125
(1935). Cases following this holding are collected at 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §124, note
2 (1956). But see note 19 supra, which cites cases involving comparable language, in which
the devises were held to be invalid trusts.
81 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); First-Mechanics Nat. Bank v.
First-Mechanics Nat. Bank, 137 N.J. ·Eq., 106, 43 A. (2d) 674 (1945). I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT
§27 (1935). See In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952). Cases on this
point are collected in 80 A.L.R. 503 (1932).
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decision to apply trust law rather than gift or power law to the
bequest may have serious consequences when the executor is
to name recipients of the testator's bounty from a class of persons. One must be accurate, however, in recognizing the precise
extent of application of the more restrictive Morice rule. This
rule dictates a different result from power law in only one of
the three possible planes of definiteness. Where there is a completely definite class, i.e., its entire membership is identifiable
or ascertainable, both a trust and a power to select is valid.32
Where the class is entirely indefinite, as where the executor is
to select the takers from a class which is to be specified in a codicil
which in fact is never executed,33 the devise is always void and
the heirs or next of kin take. 34 The present discussion centers
upon the intermediate situation, where some, but not all, of
the members can be ascertained, as where the property is to be
distributed to the "friends" of the testator. Undoubtedly, some
persons could clearly qualify as friends, but it might be quite
impossible to identify the entire class. Under power law, this
type of class is an acceptable object of bounty.35 Trust law, however, dictates that this type of class cannot be validly specified
a beneficiary.86
Although the definite beneficiary rule is so well established
at present that the courts generally feel no necessity for stating
any reason for applying it, there have been several reasons urged
as the rationale for the rule. These suggested bases will merely
be stated here and later sections of this comment will explore
their soundness.
The trust rule has been said to be based on legal necessity,
in that there cannot be a trust without a beneficiary to enforce
the trust. Under a Hohfeldian type of analysis, it is urged that
a valid trust requires a duty in the trustee and that without a
beneficiary to hold the correlative right it is impossible to im82 Hazard v. Bacon, 42 R.I. 415, 108 A. 499 (1920); In re Dewey's Estate, 45 Utah 98,
143 P. 124 (1914). 3 PROPERTY R.EsrATEMENT §323 (1940); 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §120
(1935).
33 Uloth v. Little, 321 Mass. 351, 73 N.E. (2d) 459 (1947); In re Fabbri's Will, I App.
Div. (2d) 1029, 152 N.Y.S. (2d) 100 (1956); In re Estate of Kessler, 271 Wis. 512, 74 N.W.
(2d) 146 (1956).
34 3 PROPERTY R.EsrATEMENT §323, comment h (1940); TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT, SECOND,
Tentative Draft No. 3, §122, comment e, §123, comment e (1956). See note 33 supra.
35 In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952); In re Coates, [1955] Ch.
495. 3 PROPERTY R.EsrATEMENT §323, comment h (1940).
86 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass.
472, 26 Am. Rep. 680 (1878). 1 TRUSTS R.EsrATEMENT §122 (1935).
'
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pose a duty on the trustee. 37 It has also been argued that to allow
a valid trust where there was no definite beneficiary would
violate public policy by allowing the testator to delegate to his
executor his testamentary power to dispose of his property.38
Trusts for indefinite classes are also thought to be void for want
of certainty, because it is impossible to determine to whom the
executor is to distribute the trust property. 39 Finally, the rule
against perpetuities has been given as a reason for the trust rule. 40

II. Inadequacy of Existing Law
A. Analysis of Testamentary Intent. As has been indicated,
the courts have analyzed the testator's intent in terms of whether
he intended to create a trust, or a power, or alternatively, to
make an outright gift. 41 Actually, the present discussion does
not logically encompass cases which adopt the gift construction.
Where there has been any meaningful limitation placed upon
the transfer to the executor, there would appear to be little
justification for reaching the gift interpretation. More important,
having found a gift, the court thereby ignores all of the devise
except "to my executor" which construction, of course, completely undercuts the problem at hand which centers on the
effect of the rest of the devise (e.g., "to distribute to my friends")
and on the inconsistencies between trust law and power law
with respect to the necessity of naming definite objects. Thus
while this comment deals with the validity and effect to be given
to devises which provide for the executor's selection of the ultimate takers, the gift cases, by treating this distributive language
as surplusage, fall outside of the problem. Consequently, except
to note the presence of gift cases in this area and to question
the validity of such a construction, except where there are special
considerations, this comment will center its attention on power
and trust law.
37 Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805); Scott,
"Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes," 58 HARV. L. REv. 548 at 563-565 (1945);
2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956); Gray, "Gifts for a Non-Charitable Purpose," 15
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1902).
38 Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson, [1944] A.G. 341. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed.,
§123 (1956); Scott, "Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes," 58 HARV. L. REv.
548 at 566 (1945).
39 Scott, "Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes,'' 58 HARv. L. REV. 548 at
565 (1945).
40 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956). See Smith, "Honorary Trusts and the Rule
against Perpetuities," 30 COL. L. REV. 60 (1930); SIJIIES, FUTURE INTERESTS HANDBOOK §113
(1951).
41 See SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS HANDBOOK §52, note 24 (1951).
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It becomes pertinent, then, to undertake a more penetrating
analysis of testator's intent in terms of his choice between trust
and power results. It is perhaps accurate to say, however, that
the testator does not think of either the trust or the power of
appointment as such in their legal sense. His intentions undoubtedly proceed on the more pragmatic level of the specific
result that he wishes to obtain.
These intentions may be best illustrated by consideration
of a hypothetical devise drawn from the cases: "residue to my
executor to be distributed to such persons as my executor shall
select." Given no contextual facts other than the language of
the devise, one may find that the testamentary intent here consists of three distinct elements. First, the fact that the transferee
is an executor, coupled with the normal rule of construction
that no language is to be considered surplusage if possible,42
leads to the conclusion that the executor is not to take the
property beneficially himself. 43 Second, the testator desires that
the ultimate takers of the property be those persons selected
by the executor. Finally, since the testator's dispositive scheme
will be carried out only if the executor actually selects the
distributees, it appears that the testator desires to obligate the
executor to make a selection.
B. Defects in the Traditional Doctrines. If these three objectives are what a testator would normally intend to reach
through the hypothetical devise, to what extent are the power
and trust doctrines of use to him?
The trust can certainly achieve the first of the testator's aims,
for the executor may not take beneficially as a trustee. Some
authorities indicate that upon a showing that the executor
cannot take for his own use, a devise must therefore be construed as invoking a trust framework. 44 Such a conclusion is
42Thomas v. Anderson, (8th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 642.
43 See note 3 supra.
44 Minot v. Attorney General, 189 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149 (1905); Tunis v. Dole, 97
N.H. 420, 89 A. (2d) 760 (1952). The Property Restatement would make this the sole
test of whether a power or a trust is created. 3 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §323, comment e
(1940). The standard test for determining whether a power is discretionary or in trust
is as follows: is the donee of the power under a duty to exercise it? Clark v. Campbell,
82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); 1 TRUSTS REsrATEMENT §27 (1935). However, the Property
Restatement does not recognize the mandatory-discretionary distinction with respect to
powers. 3 PROPERTY REsrATE!lfENT §320, Special Note (1940). It would recognize the
necessity of definiteness ·of objects only where the property has been transferred in trust
to a trustee who is to select the ultimate takers. The test proposed by the Property
Restatement to determine whether an executor takes in trust is this: is the executor
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not sound, since it is equally possible to create a valid power
whereby the executor is excluded as a potential appointee. 45
It appears, therefore, that both a power and trust construction
can achieve the first element of testator's intent.
A discretionary power of appointment can clearly carry out
the second element as well, permitting the executor to select the
ultimate takers. 46 There is no doubt that a trust can produce
the same result, provided that there is a valid trust. In satisfaction
of this latter condition, however, the hypothetical devise will
apparently run afoul of the definite beneficiary rule, since no
definite class of beneficiaries is specified.47
Power law cannot achieve the third objective. In order to
validate a power which takes as its object an indefinite class,
the testator must make the power discretionary, which of course
fails to impose an obligation upon the executor to make a
selection.48 If the power is coupled with a duty to exercise it,
a power in trust is created, and the power in trust is subject
to the definite beneficiary requirement; so the hypothetical
devise must again come within the Morice rule. 49 On the other
hand, although trust law is capable of obligating the executor
to make a selection, it fails to impose the obligation in the
hypothetical case, because as a trust, the bequest again must
be struck down for want of a definite beneficiary. With respect
to the third objective, then, the laws of trust and power present
precluded from taking beneficially? 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §323, comment e (1940).
The Property Restatement does not recognize the use of the term power in trust, and it
is difficult to determine what the Property Restatement does with the case represented
by the usual meaning of this concept, i.e., donee of the power is under a duty to exercise
the power. The Property Restatement gives relief for non-exercise only where the objects
of the power are such as could also be objects of a trust. 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §367
(1940). Thus, since the Property Restatement places no limit on definiteness of objects
(except that there must be some persons who can be recognizable as coming within the
class), it would seem that where there is a power in trust to an indefinite class, the
Property Restatement would allow the donee to exercise the power, although it would
provide no remedy for non-exercise. This would seem to be Ames' reasoning as will be
discussed infra.
45 In re Park, [1932] 1 Ch. 580; Dormer Estate, 348 Pa. 356, 35 A. (2d) 299 (1944);
In re Jones, [1945] Ch. 105; In re Harvey, [1950] 1 All E.R. 491. See SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS HANDBOOK §52 (1951), and 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §323, comment e (1940),
which states that such,a construction is "conceivable."
46 Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 A. 588 (1902); In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337,
241 P. (2d) 781 (1952); In re Coates, [1955] Ch. 495.
47 1 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §120 (1935). See Hazard v. Bacon, 42 R.I. 415, 108 A. 499
(1920); Markham v. Tibbetts, (S.D. N.Y. 1947) 79 F. Supp. 47.
48 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926); In re Rowland's Estate, 73
Ariz. 337, 241 P. (2d) 781 (1952).
49 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 A. 166 (1926).
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an anomaly when the object is an indefinite class. To carry
out the testator's wishes fully, the executor must be obligated
to exercise the power of selection, yet as a trust or a power in
trust (which are the only vehicles for imposing the obligation),
the devise is totally void for want of a definite beneficiary. The
devise is thus valid only as a power, the law applicable to which
does not compel the executor to exercise his discretion. Thus, the
designation of an indefinite class as the group from which the
executor is to select, as in the hypothetical devise, automatically
means that under the existing law, the testator's third objective
of imposing a duty on the executor will be frustrated. Complete
fulfillment of the testator's dispositive scheme is simply not
possible under our present legal structure.
It is suggested that the traditional analysis is too legalistic
and mechanical.50 In its initial step of construction, there is great
unpredictability as to whether it will construe a devise as a
power or a trust. Then in the second step of applying legal
doctrine, total invalidity may easily result under the trust construction. It is submitted that in the indefinite-class cases, the
courts should start with the rudiments of the testator's intent,
i.e., the results which he wishes to reach by his devise. This
intent should be measured against the available means of property distribution, and since no public policy questions are raised,
the court's purpose should be to carry out the testator's objectives
so far as is possible without distorting the devise.51 On such
an analysis, it would appear that the application of power law
would be the most satisfactory means of handling of the
indefinite-class cases, for the devise would be substantially carried out (completely carried out, if executor exercised the power).
Application of power law would involve no distortion of the
bequest. If trust law were strictly applied, the property would
go to testator's heirs or next of kin.r; 2 If power law were applied,
the property would go precisely as testator intended if the power
were exercised. If the power were not exercised, the trust property would remain in the heirs or next of kin, just as it would
50 See Scott, "Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes," 58 HARV. L. REv. 548,
563 (1945).
51 Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 A. 49 (1907), which sustained a trust for indefinite
purposes, started with the premise that the owner of property could make any distribution
of property which is not unlawful.
52 Estate of Ralston, 1 Cal. (2d) 724, 37 P. (2d) 76 (1934); Morice v. The Bishop of
Durham, 10 Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805); Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am.
Rep. 445 (1881). See note 15 supra.
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under trust law. 53 By excluding the executor as a possible appointee,54 any possibility that the property would be distributed
in conflict with testator's wishes would be eliminated.

III. Correlation of Trust and Power Law
A. The Ames Approach. The inconsistent results reached
in these indefinite-class cases by application of trust or power
law were early brought into focus by Dean Ames,55 who argued
for a partial change in the trust rule in order to make it consistent with power doctrine.
Ames apparently recognized that there were two aspects to
the definite beneficiary rule in the Morice decision: (1) unless
a testator names a definite beneficiary or beneficiaries who can
enforce the trust on their own behalf, an enforceable trust cannot be created; and (2) on failure of the bequest to create an
enforceable trust, the bequest is void and of no effect and the
executor must hold the property on a resulting trust in favor
of the heirs or next of kin. Although he apparently conceded
the validity of the first proposition, Ames disagreed with the
second, arguing that voiding the trust was a result which did
not necessarily follow from acceptance of the rule requiring
an enforceable obligation. 56 He felt that the unenforceable trust
might nevertheless be given limited legal effect. He reasoned as
follows:
It is agreed that when the executor is vested with a discretionary power to select appointees from an indefinite class, the
executor is permitted to make the selection so long as he appoints
to one who fits the description of the class designated. 57 Yet if
under the same circumstances the executor is vested with a
mandatory power of selection, the devise is void. Since the discretionary power is valid though unenforceable, it is entirely
inconsistent to hold that a mandatory power is void, because
it is unenforceable. 58 When testator attempts to impose a duty
to make a selection in the trust context, the executor should be
permitted to carry out the terms of the trust, even though no
enforceable obligation is created. The executor should have a
53 See note 65
54 See note 45
55 Ames, "The
56 Id. at 395

infra.
supra.
Failure of the Tilden Trust," 5 HARv. L. REv. 389 (1892).

57 See notes 26, 27, 28, and
58 Ames' reasoning indicates

29 supra.
that he believed that the real basis for the definite
beneficiary rule was the necessity of having someone to enforce the trust. See note 37 supra.
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discretionary power to carry out the trust in favor of persons
who clearly came within the limits of the named but indefinite
class of beneficiaries.59
The Ames position does not wholly undercut the Morice
rule, because it continues to recognize that no enforceable rights
can be vested in members of the indefinite class. It does, on the
other hand, depart from the traditional conception that specification of an indefinite class creates by operation of law a resulting
trust in favor of the heirs or next of kin.
B. Criticism of the Ames Approach. Gray and Bogert have
defended the prevailing Morice rule. 60 Gray's argument with
Ames rests on the conception that there cannot be an enforceable
trust without a definite beneficiary to whom the trustee owes
a duty. Without a beneficiary to hold a correlative right, a trust
duty cannot be imposed on the trustee. 61 He further argued
that a valid trust could not be created without a proper beneficiary in whom could be vested the equitable title to the trust
corpus. Absent such a beneficiary, legal title would be in the
trustee with equitable title in limbo. 62
59 Ames developed his argument with reference to the Tilden Trust [see Tilden v.
Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891)], which was a trust for indefinite purposes. However,
Ames would -not have limited his view to the trust for indefinite purposes, since his
rationale was based on the inconsistency of the trust rule with the rule relating to the
discretionary power of appointment. Scott has recognized the applicability of the Ames
view to the indefinite class trust. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §122 (1956). Since trusts both
for indefinite purposes and for indefinite classes of persons fail for want of a definite
beneficiary, and since in both types of cases it would be equally possible for the trustee
to carry out the trust through a power, it is believed that there is no valid basis for
according different treatment to the two types of cases, with respect to the application
of the Ames rationale.
60 In -his first edition, although he apparently personally advocates the Ames rationale,
Scott stated that the power rule was not consistent with the trust rule. l Scorr, TRUSTS,
1st ed., §122 (1939). In allowing a donee to distribute among appointees of an indefinite
class, the discretionary power rule was in conflict with Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281,
133 A. 166 (1926). The trust and power rules could, of course, be harmonized by changing
the power rule so that it conformed to the trust rule. Norris v. Thomson's Executors, 19
N.J. Eq. 307 (1868), seems to be the only authority for applying the definite-objects rule
to all powers. Such an approach would seriously undercut a most useful means of property
distribution; all but special powers would be invalidated. Since the sole achievement of
this approach would be to attain symmetry, there would appear to be no sound basis
for adopting this view. In his recent second edition, Scott does not state that the power
rule is out of line with the trust rule, and he seems to indicate that it is the trust rule,
rather than the power rule, that is defective. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§122, 123 (1956).
See also Scott, "Conveyances upon Trusts Not Properly Declared," 37 HARV. L. REv. 653
at 687, 688 (1924); Scott, "Control of Property by the Dead," 65 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 527
at 538 (1917).
61 Gray, "Gifts For a Non-Charitable Purpose," 15 HARv. L. REv. 509 at 512-514
(1902). GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., Appendix H. (1915). But see GRAY,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §909 (1942).
62 Gray, "Gifts For a Non-Charitable Purpose," 15 HARv. L. REv. 509 at 514 (1902).
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Gray's cntlcISm fails to recognize that there are potentially
two means by which the definite beneficiary might be changed
in order to make it consistent with power law. The first would be
to abolish the Morice rule completely and permit the creation of
a trust for which there is no beneficiary. The second would be to
modify the rule so that instead of totally invalidating a trust
for which the beneficiary is indefinite courts would give effect
to the devise only so far as is possible under the guides furnished
by the testator. Gray appeared to believe that Ames subscribed
to the first alternative, and if this were so, there would be merit
in his criticism. But it would appear that Ames followed the
second course, permitting the trustee to carry out the otherwise
unenforceable trust. Since Ames' analysis is explained in terms
of a power-liability relationship, Gray's right-duty criticism would
seem inappropriate. 63
Gray's second argument, based upon the absence of a person
or persons in whom to vest equitable title, is also met under
the Ames view. Equitable title is vested in the heirs or next of
kin, subject to divestment by the exercise of the executor's power
of selection, and legal title is in the executor. All estate interests
are therefore properly vested. 64
Analyzing the executor's action in terms of power rather than
duty does not completely eliminate checks upon his discretion.
The power to carry out the trust would presumably exist for
only a reasonble time before it would be extinguished, and if
the executor attempted to use his power in a means not contemplated by the terms of the bequest, his act could be held not
to have divested the heirs or next of kin of equitable title.65
Such checks would appear to be no less effective than those
available under trust law.
Bogert's criticism is based upon a fear that the trust institu63 Gray's answer to this proposition would be that the testator intended to create
either a mandatory or a discretionary power; if the former were intended, the devise
must stand or fall as such. Id. at 513.
64 Scott has suggested that the heirs or next of kin take on a resulting trust which
is subject to a condition precedent that the executor fails to exercise his power to carry
out the trust. Scott, "Control of Property by the Dead," 65 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 527 at 538
(1917); Scott, "Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly Declared," 37 HARv. L. REv. 653
at 687, 688 (1924). If the equitable title of the heirs or next of kin were subject to a condition precedent, then the equitable title would still be outstanding and vested in no one.
Gray's criticism would thus be valid. In his recent second edition, however, Scott states
that the equitable title vests immediately in the heirs or next of kin from whom it can be
divested by exercise of the power. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956).
651 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §124, comment" b (1935); TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, SECOND,
Tentative Draft No. 3, §122, comment d, §123, comment d (1956).
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tion will be further diluted by acceptance of the Ames approach.
He feels that in order to derive the traditional benefits available
from use of a trust, one should be required to comply precisely
with its requirements. Any chipping away at these requirements
will lead to uncertainty and confusion. 66 It seems obvious, however, that the Ames view would not compel a departure from the
accepted requirements for creation of an enforceable trust, but
would only place a power in the trustee not heretofore recognized. It may be further suggested that instead of lending uncertainty to the law, the Ames rationale would render the law
more certain. The present law would appear to provide very
little basis for predicting whether a devise created a valid power
or an invalid trust.
To the criticisms of these authors may be added the suggested
justifications for creation and preservation of the definite beneficiary trust rule outlined in section I-C above. The first justification there indicated amounts to no more than Gray's criticism
of the Ames view, based upon a Hohfeldian type of analysis,
just discussed, and appears to require no further comment. The
second argument advanced in favor of the Morice rule, that
enforcement of a trust in favor of an indefinite class of beneficiaries would amount to ·usurpation of testamentary powers, is
not a sound basis for attacking the Ames view. The courts have
shown constant willingness to accept the validity of the discretionary power of appointment, which potentially is equally
capable of usurping testamentary powers. This willingness would
appear to indicate that any public policy opposing invasion of
the testator's domain is insubstantial at best when applied to
these cases in the manner that Ames advocates. 67
Uncertainty as to taker was the basis for the third argument
in favor of the definite beneficiary rule. It may be submitted
that while this contention would have validity as to a trust in
favor of a wholly indefinite class, 68 it is inapplicable as a ground
for attacking the Ames view. Ames' doctrine is intended to apply
only to the case where the class is partially definite; in such event,
the executor is permitted to appoint solely persons whom the
court determines to fall definitely within the class. 69
66 lA BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§162, 166
67 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956).
68 See notes 33 and 34 supra.
69 In re Gestetner Settlement, [1953] Ch. 672;

(1907).

(1951).
Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 A. 49
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To the final argument that the rule against perpetmtles is
a bar to a trust in favor of an indefinite class, one may reply that
the executor's power would need to be exercised within a reasonable time or at least within his lifetime. Under this interpretation, the power could not be exercised beyond the period of
the rule. On closer analysis it will be noted that the rule against
perpetuities is not actually a reason for the definite beneficiary
rule. Whereas the trust rule is concerned with what is the proper
beneficiary of a trust, 70 the rule against perpetuities deals, in the
present setting, with the wholly independent question of when the
trustee can exercise his power of selection. The latter inquiry
is pertinent in determining validity, irrespective of whether
the class of objects is definite or indefinite.
C. Acceptance by the Trusts Restatements. As originally published, the Restatement of Trusts largely followed the great
weight of authority with respect to the rules pertaining to trust
beneficiaries.71 The honorary trust doctrine, however, was broadly extended to allow the trustee of any unenforceable trust to
carry out its terms, if specific, non-capricious purposes were
named as the object of the trust. 72 Where the trust was created
for a partially indefinite class,. no such discretion was given the
trustee as Ames would suggest, 73 except where the trustee was
to select the beneficiaries from among the testator's relatives74
in which case the trustee could make the selection, even though
there was no enforceable trust. 75
In a recently approved revision to the Restatement of Trusts,

2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §123 (1956). See note 65 supra.
1 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §§112, 122, 123, 124, 125 (1935).
72 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §124 (1935). The decided cases have not applied the
honorary trust rule to all trusts for specific purposes, but the rule has been limited chiefly
to trusts for animals, for care of graves, erection of monuments and a few other similar
specific purposes. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§124 to 124.7 (1956). In Estate of Reed, 82
Cal. App. (2d) 448, 186 P. (2d) 147 (1947), although the devise in trust was for the specific
purpose of carrying on the work of two named persons, the bequest was held totally
void, the court applying the general trust rule. But see In re Thompson, [1934] Ch. 342,
where the honorary trust doctrine was applied to a trust for the specific purpose of
promoting foxhunting. The A.L.l. apparently recognized that §124 involved an extension
of the honorary trust doctrine, for in comment d, §124, it notes that the rule has been
applied in the types of cases enumerated above.
73 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §122 (1935).
74 "Relatives" constitutes an indefinite class when it is interpreted to mean everyone
who is related to the testator. If "relatives" is used to mean only the testator's next of
kin, then it constitutes a definite class.
75 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §121 (1935). See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §121 (1956). See
Huling v. Fenner, 9 R.l. 410 (1870).
70

71
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there have been two changes accepted which would allow the
trustee of an unenforceable trust, either for an indefinite class
or for general or indefinite purposes, to carry out the trust, if
the trustee were directed or authorized by the terms of the trust
to select the ultimate takers from the class or the purpose, and
if the class or purpose were not entirely indefinite.76 Together
with the existing broadly stated honorary trust rule, these two
changes appear to represent a complete adoption of the Ames
rationale in the Restatement.
D. Acceptance by the Courts. In contrast to this change in
the Restatement viewpoint, there has appeared very little judicial precedent giving support for Ames' suggested revision of
the definite beneficiary rule. The vast majority of jurisdictions
do not accept his position, and, indeed, do not even bother to
discuss it.
Perhaps the greatest amount of support is to be encountered
in the honorary trust cases, where a specific purpose is designated,
but no definite beneficiary is named. Despite the fact that there
is no definite beneficiary to whom the trustee's duty is owing
and by whom the trust can be enforced, these trusts are generally
accepted as valid to the limited extent of giving the trustee a
power to carry out the trust. Trusts of which the purpose was
to benefit animals, 77 erect monuments,78 care for graves,79 and a
few other similar specific purposes have been upheld.80
There are at least three American decisions which did not
decree total invalidity where a definite beneficiary was not designated.81 These courts allowed the executor to select the trust
beneficiaries, where the devise named general purposes which
were sufficiently definite so that a court could determine whether
a given selectee came within the named purposes. One English
decision, in permitting a trustee to carry out a trust for a partially

76 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, SECOND, Tentative Draft No. 3, §§122, 123 (1956). For the
A.L.I.'s discussion of proposed §§122 and 123, see 33rd Annual Meeting, A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS
445-454 (1956). The second edition, embodying these changes, was adopted in 1957. See
34th Annual Meeting, A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 279 (1957).
77 In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889); In re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App. 417, 95
N .E. (2d) 779 (1950).
78 Estate of Koppikus, 1 Cal. App. 84, 81 P. 732 (1905).
79 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §124.2 (1956).
so 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§124 to 124.7 (1956). See In re Thompson, [1934] Ch. 342.
See note 25 supra.
81 Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 A. 49 (1907); Cochran v. McLaughlin, 128 Conn.
638, 24 A. (2d) 836 (1942); Feinberg v. Feinberg, (Del. Ch. 1957) 131 A. (2d) 658.

1184

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ ':'ol. 56

definite class, appears to have enunciated precisely the Ames
viewpoint. 82 Other cases which hold that a power is created where
th~ executor is directed to distribute, lend indirect support to the
Ames position,83 and the ruling that a valid power can be created
which excludes only the executor as a possible appointee also
provides some support, by undercutting the position that a
· trust must be intended if the executor cannot take beneficially.84

IV. Conclusion
Prevailing trust and power law, when applied side by side
in the perspective of bequests to executors for distribution,
produce inconsistent results. The courts, however, have shown
little inclination to correlate the two or to alter their traditional
"pigeon-holing" method of analysis by which these principles
are applied. It is submitted that the concepts of power and trust
should be employed, not as ends in themselves, but as means for
effectuating the desires of the testator. Acceptance of the Ames
rationale would provide a sound step in this direction and would
solve at least part of the present conflict between trust and power
doctrines. It seems but common sense to give the executor a
power by the use of which he can fully effectuate a bequest,
rather than imposing total invalidity of the trust as a sanction
for testator's failure to specify all the potential beneficiaries to
whom the executor may distribute.

William P. Wooden, S.Ed.

82 In re Gestetner Settlement,
83 See notes 26, 27, 28 and 29

[1953] Ch. 672.
supra. The final result of In re Rowland's Estate, 73
Ariz. 337,241 P. (2d) 781 (1952), was a holding that there was a power in trust where the
object was definite and a discretionary power where the class of objects was indefinite.
Some courts reason that, since no definite beneficiaries are named, the testator intended
to create a power. In re Lidston's Estate, 32 Wash. (2d) 408, 202 P. (2d) 259 (1949);
Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730, 298 N.W. 895 (1941); Gilman v. Gilman, 99 Conn.
598, 122 A. 386 (1923); and Harvey, Exr. v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, 111 A. 437 (1920).
It should be noted that, although the cases cited in this note reach the ultimate Ames
result, they do so within the existing framework of the law by holding, as a matter of
construction, that a power was intended by the devise. This reasoning is to be distinguished from the Ames view which would hold that, even though a devise be construed
as an intended trust, the executor or trustee would ,be given a power to carry out the
unenforceable trust. To what extent, if any, the Ames rationale has influenced courts
in finding a power as a matter of construction is not discernible from the decisions.
84 In re Park, [1932] 1 Ch. 580. See note 45 supra. Dormer Estate, 348 Pa.
356, 35 A. (2d) 299 (1944), is apparently the only American decision in point. The two
executors were found to have a power which was general, except that they could not
appoint to themselves. Unfortunately, the direct holding of the case, that on the death
of one executor the power was destroyed, does not directly support this proposition.

